There have been recent advances in solving the finite extension field discrete logarithm problem as it arises in the context of pairing-friendly elliptic curves. This has lead to the abandonment of approaches based on supersingular curves of small characteristic, and to the reconsideration of the field sizes required for implementation based on nonsupersingular curves of large characteristic. This has resulted in a revision of recommendations for suitable curves, particularly at a higher level of security. Indeed for AES-256 levels of security the BLS48 curves have been suggested, and demonstrated to be superior to other candidates. These curves have an embedding degree of 48. The well known taxonomy of Freeman, Scott and Teske only considered curves with embedding degrees up to 50. Given some uncertainty around the constants that apply to the best discrete logarithm algorithm, it would seem to be prudent to push a little beyond 50. In this note we announce the discovery of a new family of pairing friendly elliptic curves which includes a new construction for a curve with an embedding degree of 54.
Introduction
One of great break-throughs in pairing-based cryptography was the discovery of the BN curves [3] . A group size of 256 bits (to match the AES-128 bit level of security) can be supported by an elliptic curve over a field also of 256 bits, and since the embedding degree is 12, the size of the discrete logarithm (DL) problem over the extension field is 3072 bits. Which was a serendipitous direct hit on the size of DL problem believed to correspond to AES-128. The fit was perfect.
Recall that protocols based on bilinear pairings typically consist of operations on 3 groups, denoted as G 1 , G 2 and G T , and the calculation of the pairing itself, usually denoted as w = e(P, Q), where the pairing takes two elliptic curve point parameters P ∈ G 1 and Q ∈ G 2 respectively, and evaluates to an element in the finite extension field w ∈ G T . Here G 1 is contained in the elliptic curve E(F p ), G 2 is contained in E (F p k/d ), and G T is contained in the finite extension field F p k , where k is the embedding degree associated with the pairing-friendly curve, and d is a divisor of k corresponding to a supported twisted curve E . Note that G 2 points can be manipulated on the smaller twisted curve, and transformed to a point on E(F p k ) only when needed.
The pairing calculation consists of two parts, a Miller loop followed by a final exponentiation. In real-world protocols much of the action takes place in the smallest group G 1 , although implementors have tended to concentrate more on the pairing itself. In more complex protocols products of pairings are required, and here a single final exponentiation can be applied to an amalgamation of Miller loops [18] .
A BN curve is an example of a parameterised pairing-friendly curve, that is fixed polynomial formulae exist for the prime modulus p and the group order r in terms of an integer parameter u, which is chosen such that both p and r are prime. Such parameterised curves have become very popular for many reasons. First the ratio between the group and field size can be as low as one, and secondly multiple optimizations become possible. The most significant of these would be the development of the optimal Ate pairing [21] , for which the number of iterations of the Miller loop is reduced from the number of bits in r (as required for the original Tate pairing) to the number of bits in u. Since the degrees of the defining polynomial formulae increase with the embedding degree, rather paradoxically this implies that the number of iterations required in the Miller loop actually tends to decrease as the security level increases. Also a simpler form of final exponentiation applies [19] .
However almost immediately after BN curves were introduced, Schirokauer [17] in a paper introducing the Number Field Sieve (NFS), warned us that: "Without discussing the evident difficulty of implementing the NFS for degree 12 fields, we observe that the special form of p may reduce the difficulty of computing logarithms in F p 12 ". In the absence of any concrete evidence to support this concern, the BN curve was nonetheless widely adopted. However Schirokauer's warning has proven to be prescient and the field of pairing-based cryptography has been disrupted by the recent, but not entirely surprising, discovery of a faster algorithm for solving the discrete logarithm problem in the finite extension field that arises when using these types of pairings. See [1] , [12] .
A pairing-friendly curve can be characterised by the defining triplet {ρ, k, d}, where ρ is the ratio between the number of bits in p and the number of bits in r. Given a group size of g bits, the field size of G 1 is f 1 = ρg, the extension field size of G T is f T = ρkg, and the field size of G 2 AES-128 AES-192 AES-256  NFS  3072  7680  15360  exTNFS  3618  9241  18480  SexTNFS  5004  12871  27410   Table 1 : Recommended extension field sizes is f 2 = f T /d, where d is from the set of possible twists {1, 2, 3, 4, 6}, and is usually the maximum from this set that divides k.
DL Algorithm
When choosing a suitable curve, the starting point is the security level in AES-equivalent bits, typically 128, 192 or 256. The group size should ideally be exactly twice this, and the other field sizes are then immediately fixed as shown above by the defining triplet.
For example for AES-128 security of a BN curve, the defining triplet is 1, 12, 6, and given g = 256, then f 1 = 256, f T = 3072, and f 2 = 512. For a BLS12 curve (by which we mean a BLS curve with embedding degree of 12, see below), the triplet is 3/2, 12, 6, and given g = 256, then f 1 = 384, f T = 4608, and f 2 = 768.
The main problem is to satisfy the security requirement for G T , so that it matches that for G 1 . See Table 1 . Note that these numbers are rather imprecise as exact analysis is difficult. We have mainly followed the analysis of Barbulescu and Duquesne [1] , extrapolating in places, rather than the less conservative estimates of Menezes, Sarkar and Singh [14] . However the estimates they provide depend on certain constants, in which one can have diminishing confidence as the security level increases.
Basically, according to current knowledge, the NFS estimates now apply only to prime order fields of prime extension. The extNFS estimates apply to composite order extensions, and the SexNFS estimates to parameterised prime, composite order extensions, like the BN curves. It is now clear that BN curves are not quite as perfect as originally thought. As Barbulescu and Duquesne put it: "Variants of NFS where p is parameterized are considered to be the dream situation for an attacker", although they do go on to offer some reassurance that they do not expect any further improvements in the SexTNFS algorithm.
We should say a word about G 2 . Since this is of a size an integer multiple of G 1 , we can be confident that if G 1 is secure then so is G 2 . However in the optimal Ate pairing [21] , each iteration of the Miller loop typically involves at least a point doubling in G 2 . Therefore we would like G 2 to be as small as possible, and therefore the twist d to be as large as possible. The maximum possible on an elliptic curve is d = 6, and therefore we would like to attain this if possible. A necessary condition for this to be possible is that 6|k. Note however that as the embedding degree k increases, so must G 2 . Ideally we do not want G 2 growing too large, as elliptic curve cryptography over large extension fields will be very slow (and probably best implemented using affine coordinates).
From an implementation point of view the ideal solution is one that keeps f 1 as small as possible, while meeting all of the security constraints. This assumes that the value of ρ is small, that the embedding degree is such that we serendipitously hit the appropriate target in Table 1 , and that a sextic twist applies and so the embedding degree is a multiple of 6.
An alternative response might be to revert to the Cocks-Pinch construction [15] , avoiding parameterized curves, while continuing to use composite order extensions. It is not difficult to generate such curves for k = 0 mod 6 such that sextic twists can be supported, although only for ρ ≥ 2. The idea would be to revert to the original Tate pairing and adopt the lower extTNFS estimates. However this is unlikely to prove competitive in practise.
BLS and KSS curves
BLS curves are the original small discriminant parameterised family of families of pairing-friendly elliptic curves [2] . For any positive embedding degree k = 0 mod 6 (unless 18|k), they provide simple formulae from which can be derived pairing friendly curves which support the maximal twist of d = 6, and have a relatively small ρ value given by ρ = (2 + k/3)/ϕ(k) [9] . Observe that the value of ρ decreases with increasing values of k. Having a range of embedding degrees to choose from makes it easier to hit the optimal values in Table 1 for any security level.
For example Barbulescu and Duquesne [1] have demonstrated that the BLS12 curve is a good fit for the AES-128 level of security, and the BLS24 curve is the best choice for AES-192. In another recent paper Kiyomura et al. [13] , reacting to the new understanding, demonstrated that a BLS48 curve is also the best choice of pairing-friendly curve to meet the new estimates for the 256-bit level of security. In this case the security requirement could be met with a group size of 512 bits, a modulus of 576 bits (as ρ = 9/8), and a finite field extension size of 48 · 576 = 27648.
However the BLS curves do not exist for 18|k, as in these cases the polynomial formula for p is not irreducible, and therefore cannot generate primes [9] . Serendipitously for the cases of k = 18 and k = 36 there do exist the alternative KSS curves [11] , which, as luck would have it, provide curves with the same ρ values as determined by the above formula for the missing BLS curves. However since the taxonomy of Freeman, Scott and Teske does not explore beyond k = 50, the situation for k = 54 is currently unknown. But if a BLS curve did exist for k = 54, then from the formula given above, it would have a ρ value of 10/9.
The new discovery
The new curve was discovered using the KSS method as described in [11] . It was immediately observed that the new curve found with embedding degree 54 is not of the form of a typical KSS curve, where integer solutions exist only in a restricted set of residue classes. Recall that the KSS method also rediscovers the BN curves [3] . It appeared possible that the new family of curves was, like the BN curves, a "sporadic", and not related to any existing family. On the other hand it has a certain symmetry, which suggested that it might be a member of an as-yet undiscovered family of families.
We found that −ζ 54 − ζ 10 54 as a suitable element ∈ Q(ζ 54 ), and following the KSS method [11] 
where p is the prime modulus, r is the prime order of the pairing-friendly group, t is the trace of the Frobenius, and c is a cofactor. It can be verified that the Complex Multiplication (CM) discriminant is D = 3 because 4p − t 2 = 3f 2 , for some polynomial f . This implies that the curve has twists of degree 6 which, as with the BN and BLS curves, facilitates an important optimization. Observe that the prime p can be any of 1, 3, 5 or 7 mod 8 depending on the choice of u. The total number of points on the curve will be #E = cr.
Recall that the embedding degree is the smallest value of k such that r|(p k − 1) [15] . In this case it is easily confirmed that k = 54. The value of ρ = deg(p)/ deg(r) = 10/9, which is close to the ideal value of 1.
Aurifeuillean construction of pairing-friendly curves
The method of discovery does not explain the particular form of the new curve, or whether or not it is a member of a larger "family of families". To answer these questions we take a different approach. The Aurifeuillean factorization of cyclotomic polynomials is a well-known tool used in the Cunningham project 1 [7] to factor large integers of the form b n ± 1, where b is a square-free basis, b ∈ {2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12}. Some of the factors can be obtained with the algebraic factorisation: since
For some combinations of bases and powers, more factors can be obtained with the Aurifeuillean factorization of the cyclotomic polynomials [16, 20, 5] :
Lemma 4.1. Let k > 1 be an integer and let Φ k (u) denote the k-th cyclotomic polynomial. Let a be a square-free integer and s an integer. Then Φ k (as 2 ) will factor if
• a ≡ 1 (mod 4) and a ≡ k (mod 2a)
• or a ≡ 2, 3 (mod 4) and 2a ≡ k (mod 4a).
This fact is already known for pairing-friendly curves: it was used to compute the order of the supersingular elliptic curves in characteristic 3 of embedding degree 6 (see for instance [8, Table 1]) . Let E/F 3 be a supersingular elliptic curve defined over F 3 for an odd . If the curve has embedding degree 6, then the order of E(F 3 ) is a divisor of Φ 6 (3 ), where Φ 6 (u) = u 2 − u + 1. Assuming that = 2m + 1, the Aurifeuillean factorization is Φ 6 (3u 2 ) = (3u 2 + 3u + 1)(3u 2 − 3u + 1). Replacing u by 3 m so that 3u 2 = 3·3 2m = 3 , we get Φ 6 (3 2m+1 ) = (3 2m+1 +3 m+1 +1)(3 2m+1 −3 m+1 +1), and #E(F 3 ) = (3 − 3 ( +1)/2 + 1). We will apply this tool to find new families of pairing-friendly ordinary curves in large characteristic for k = 3 j and k = 2 · 3 j . Moreover this factorization pattern provides a larger framework for pairing-friendly curve construction, and a general point of view for the construction of MNT curves, BN curves and Freeman's curves.
Aurifeuillean construction
We combine the Brezing-Weng method [6] , providing cyclotomic families, with Lemma 4.1, to obtain Algorithm 1. The idea is to look for a ∈ [−2k, 2k] satisfying Lemma 4.1 so that Φ k (au 2 ) = r(u)r(−u), and we continue as for the Brezing-Weng method, with r(u) a factor of Φ k (au 2 ), and ζ k = au 2 . The number field K = Q[u]/(r(u)) contains a square root of a. In the case where a > 0 we can choose D = a, or a | D.
We ran Algorithm 1 for 7 ≤ k ≤ 100, and small D (1 ≤ D ≤ 100). We checked that the polynomials r(x) and p(x) can give prime integers (there exist several x 0 such that p(x 0 ) and r(x 0 ) are prime at the same time). For k = 7 and k = 35, p(x) does not represent primes (p is always even for k = 7 and 21 | p for k = 35). We obtained new families of pairing-friendly curves of ρ value as good as [9] for k ∈ {9, 15, 21, 30, 33, 39, 42, 45, 51, 54, 57, 66, 69, 75, 78, 81, 87, 90, 93}. Each time the best ρ was obtained for a = 3 or a = −3, and D = 3. For k = 12, the output is the BN curve family. As an example, we give the parameters obtained for k = 15. The family for k = 9 (Example 4.5) falls in our new construction that we present in the next section. . We obtain a family with D = 3, deg r(u) = 8 and ρ = 4/3 as in [9] . Φ 15 (−3u 2 ) = r(u)r(−u) where r(u) = 81u 8 + 81u 7 + 54u 6 + 27u 5 + 9u 4 + 9u 3 + 6u 2 + 3u + 1. There are two choices for t(u), producing two families with ρ = 4/3: We now explain the generalization of the k = 54 family to any k = 3 j using an Aurifeuillean factorization of Φ 3 j (u). We start by the general expression:
Algorithm 1:
If k = 3 j , then to obtain an Aurifeuillean factorization, we take a = −3 ≡ 1 mod 4, we need k = a mod 2a ⇔ 3 j = 3 mod 6, indeed this is always the case. The degree of Φ k (u) is m = 2 · 3 j−1 , in particular m is even and m/2 is odd. We obtain the Aurifeuillean factorization:
where
We choose D = 3, we compute √ −3 and its inverse modulo r(u):
We know that −3u 2 is a primitive k-th root of unity in K = Q(u)/(r(u)). All the (−3u 2 ) e for 3 e are primitive k-th roots of unity modulo r(u), i.e. e = 0 mod 3. We have
To get ρ = deg p/ deg r as small as possible, we want to minimize max(deg t(u), deg y(u)) .
The possible degrees e to get the smallest possible degree of p(u) are listed in Table 2 , with the values of t(u), y(u) mod r(u), and p(u). 
Aurifeuillean family for
We proceed the same way as in Section 4.2. The general expression for
To obtain an Aurifeuillean factorization of Φ 2·3 j (u), we choose a = 3(= 3 mod 4) and the condition k = 2a (mod 4a) ⇔ k = 2 · 3 j = 6 mod 12 is always satisfied since 6 | k but 4 k. We obtain
where again
We take D = 3, and we know that 3u 2 is a primitive k-th root (a primitive 2 · 3 j -th root) of unity in K = Q(ω) where ω is a root of r(u). In the same way as previously we obtain Table 3 . The polynomial r(u) is the same but the trace differs and the embedding degree of the family is doubled.
j odd e (m + 2)/4, e = 5 mod 6 deg As speculated in Section 3, the k = 54 family found with the KSS method is indeed a member of a larger "family of families". Construction 4.3. For n = 3 j and m = ϕ(n), then a pairing-friendly curve with embedding degree of k = 2n if j is odd, and k = n if j is even, with discriminant D = 3, and with a ρ value of (m + 2)/m, can be found as
Construction 4.4. For n = 3 j and m = ϕ(n), then a pairing-friendly curve with embedding degree of k = n or k = 2n, with discriminant D = 3, and with a ρ value of (m + 4)/m, can be found as
This hypothesis has been tested for all applicable embedding degrees less than 1000. However it is not particularly useful for cases other than k = 54. For the embedding degrees that arise from these formulae which are less than 54 (6 and 9), there already exist curves with the same or better ρ value. The higher values of embedding degree (81, 486) are probably not useful in practice.
Applications
Our Aurifeuillean constructions 4.3 and 4.4 for k = 3 j and k = 2 · 3 j can be applied when the Brezing-Weng construction and the construction 6.6 of [9] do not provide a satisfying result. The Brezing-Weng fails for k = 54 (p(u) is never irreducible) and k = 90: p is not irreducible, or does not generate primes. The construction 6.6 of [9] fails for 18 | k (k = 18, 36, 54, 72, 90). We can alternatively use the Aurifeuillean construction when 18 | k and 8 k, that is k ∈ {18, 54, 90}. Unfortunately for k = 18 the Aurifeuillean construction gives ρ = 5/3, larger than ρ = 4/3 achieved by [11] (referenced as construction 6.12 in [9] ). The construction provides a new family for k = 54 with ρ = 10/9. For k = 90 however, the coefficients of p(u) are very large and such a large embedding degree is unlikely to be used in pairingbased cryptography.
Our family also covers k = 9 and as a conclusion we provide our alternative choice for k = 9 and D = 3.
Example 4.5. Aurifeuillean construction for k = 9. Φ 9 (−3u 2 ) = r(u)r(−u) where r(u) = 27u 6 + 9u 3 + 1. Three are three choices for the trace t(u).
With D = 3, we obtain ρ = 4/3.
MNT curves as Aurifeuillean curves for k = 3. The MNT construction provides three families of curves of embedding degree 3, 4 and 6 respectively. The curve for k = 3 can be obtained with the Aurifeuillean factorization of Φ 3 (u), and the two curves for k = 4, 6 with the cyclotomic construction. We start with Φ 3 (−3u 2 ) = (3u 2 + 3u + 1)(3u 2 − 3u + 1) = r(u)r(−u). The two choices for the trace are −3u 2 + 1 mod r(u) = −3u + 2 = t 1 and (−3u 2 ) 2 +1 mod r(u) = 3u−1 = t 2 . Since t 1 = t 2 (−u+1), we continue with t = 3u − 1, and compute p(u) = r(u) + t(u) − 1 = 3u 2 − 1. We obtain the first MNT curve (see Table 4 .4), with the change of variable l = 2u (indeed, p = 3u 2 − 1 is always even for odd u, so the MNT family takes l = 2u). The CM equation is 4p − t 2 = 3u 2 + 6u − 5, and requires to solve a Pell equation as in the original paper. The MNT curve families for k = 4 and k = 6 do not correspond to the Aurifeuillean construction, but to a cyclotomic construction (r(u) = Φ k (u)). The two Aurifeuillean constructions (without choosing −D as a square in Q(ζ k )) for k = 4, 6 produce supersingular curves of characteristic 2 and 3 respectively. We summarise this in Table 4 .4.
Further investigations
Granville and Pleasants [10] investigated the possibility that there are other identities still to be discovered. Wagstaff [22] used the Cunningham tables to try unsuccessfully to discover new identities. His results tend to confirm the theoretical results of [10] that under reasonable definitions, Schinzel found the last Aurifeuillean-like factorizations. It seems very unlikely that a new mysterious pairing-friendly family as the Barreto-Naehrig curves with ρ = 1 will be discovered with similar techniques: we ran Algorithm 1 for k ≤ 100 without success.
New discoveries are still possible, but will more probably arise with large computer search for factorization of Φ k (g(u)) for polynomials g(u) of degree strictly larger than 2, as for k = 8. 
An example construction
An actual curve can be generated using the seed value u = C404042 16 , which has a low Hamming weight of 6. Then the curve
is a pairing-friendly elliptic curve with a group order r of 512 bits, and a modulus p of 569 bits. Given the embedding degree of 54, the finite extension field is of size 30726 bits, comfortably, but not excessively, above the size recommended for an overall security equivalent to AES-256 (from table 1 ). The embedding degree k = 54 is obviously of the desirable form k = 2 i 3 j , which simplifies implementation [13] .
To derive an optimal pairing, following [21] we find the shortest vector in a lattice and observe that u + up 9 + p 10 = 0 mod r. Then an optimal Ate pairing is defined as t(Q, P ) = (f p 9 +1 u,Q (P ).l p 9 uQ+p 10 Q,uQ (P ).l p 10 Q,p 9 uQ (P ))
The Miller loop (of just 28 iterations, given the bit length of u) provides f u,Q (P ) and the value of uQ, after which two line function evaluations, some cheap applications of the Frobenius operator, and a final exponentiation complete the calculation.
Implementation will require the construction of a tower of extensions. Since G 2 is over E (F p 9 ) it would make sense to use a 1-3-9-18-54 towering, similar to that recommended for the k = 18 case [4] . It is apparent from the defining equation that p = 1 mod 3. It is also clear that u must be even to generate primes. So we make the substitution u = 2v and from there it is straightforward if tedious to coerce Fermat's identity p = a 2 + 3b 2 where a = 1 + 3v + 2 8 
As demonstrated by Benger and Scott [4] this implies by Euler's conjecture that x 54 − 2 is irreducible over F p as long as 3 b, which is equivalent to the simple condition that 3 u.
Conclusion
We present a new family of pairing friendly curves with an embedding degree of k = 54, which fills a gap that might be useful in the event of a deeper understanding emerging of the true difficulty of the discrete logarithm problem as it applies to high-security pairing-based cryptography. Motivated by this discovery we place it into a wider context, and identify it as just one member of a larger family of curves. The k = 54 solution may have been previously overlooked as the limit of practical interest was at one time conservatively estimated as being 50 [9] . We also strived to find a solution for the next "missing" case of k = 72 (by which we mean an embedding degree which is a multiple of six, and which is not covered by the BLS construction) but failed despite an extensive computer search. Nevertheless clearly the KSS method is a powerful tool for discovering families of pairing-friendly curves.
